R O Roberts, National Library of Wales journal Vol XI/1 Summer 1959.

Extracted onto the pages of GENUKI with the kind permission of the National Library of Wales

This is a complete extract of this article [Gareth Hicks 2003]

An enabling clause in the Country Bankers Act passed on 26 May 1826 placed beyond doubt the right of the Bank of England to set up Branches in the provinces --- as had been proposed since the close of the previous century and earlier. 2 Their establishment after May 1826 was due to powerful suggestions made during the preceding six months by Ministers of the Crown and to action by the Bank itself. The Government pressure on the Bank was indubitably of great importance, but the usual view that the Bank in 1826 was very 'reluctant' to set up Branches does not seem well founded. 3

Informal discussions about the establishment of Branches appear to have taken place between Ministers and the Bank's Governors before 1826, but the Bank is reported to have 'always declined' the Branch Bank policy. 4  On 12 January 1826, however, 'recent events having shewn that an alteration in the system of Country Banks will be necessary', the Bank appointed a committee to consider 'how far it may be practicable to establish Branch Banks'. 5 The setting up of the committee was undoubtedly due very largely to the Bank's fears of 'strong measures' 6   by the Government which might seriously affect its monopoly of joint-stock banking in England and Wales. Indeed, on 13 January, when the committee commenced their deliberations, a memorandum was signed by the Prime Minister (Lord Liverpool) and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (F. J. Robinson) which discussed the current financial crisis and, among other things, 'stated bluntly that the Bank must either start Branches or relinquish its monopoly'. 7  Mr. Marston Acres, however, believed that the contents 'were not communicated to members ... [of the Branch Banks] Committee', 8  but it is highly probable that the senior members had been informed. 9  The Committee certainly were aware of dangers to the Bank from the direction of the Government, for they enjoined speed in the setting up of Branches lest there might be 'encroachments on its [the Bank of England's] circulation by the erection of other chartered Banks'. 10

• 1. In addition to my sincere thanks to the staff of the National Library, I wish to record my gratitude to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England for granting access to manuscript books belonging to the Bank, and to the staff for their unfailing kindness.
• 2. Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England (Cambridge, 1944), vol.I, p. 105, vol. II, pp. 91-2, 103-4.
• 3. Professor T. S. Ashton gives the general view when he states that the Bank 'reluctantly yielded to the pressure of Lord Liverpool and began to open note-issuing branches in the provinces' ( The Industrial Revolution, London, 1948, pp. 104-5).
• 4. Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 92. Professor R. S. Sayers states that 'the Bank was for long reluctant' ( Lloyds Bank in the History of English Banking, Oxford, 1957, p. 141 fn.).
• 5. Quoted by W. Marston Acres, The Bank of England from Within, 1694-1900 (London, 1931), vol. II, p. 427.
• 6. Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 104, quoting the Bank of England's Court Book Wa, 19 January 1826.
• 7. ibidem.
• 8. op. cit., p. 427.
• 9. I am grateful to Mr. J. A. Giuseppi, of the Bank of England, for this view and for other assistance in the preparation of this paper.
• 10. Quoted by Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 104.

The Committee, having considered reports from the Bank of Scotland and the Bank of Ireland about their branch organisations, on 18 January recommended the establishment of Branch Banks for a number of reasons additional to Government pressure. The policy, they said, 'would increase the circulation of Bank Notes, give the Bank more complete control than it now possesses over the whole paper circulation and enable it to prevent a recurrence of such a convulsion as we have lately seen'. It was expected to lead to a 'very large' growth in deposits and it would protect the Bank against the competition of 'large Banking Companies'. The public would gain---from a better and less fluctuating note circulation, from improved means of moving money from one town to another and from 'widespread places of perfectly safe deposit'. The establishment of Branches in 'the principal commercial towns', reported the Committee, would be 'for the benefit of the Bank as well as to the interest of the Public and the Government'. 1

This report favouring Branch Banks was considered and approved by the Court of Directors of the Bank on 20 January, when it also discussed Lord Liverpool's memorandum, which pointed a well-loaded pistol at 'the Old Lady'. There followed exchanges about the limitation of the Bank's monopoly of jointstock banking and, at the end of January, the Prime Minister and the Chancellor stated that, though 'the establishment of Branches would not of itself be sufficient to meet all the exigencies of the country', they were 'decidedly of opinion that the formation of them under proper regulations would be highly advantageous both to the Bank and the community'. 2  On 9 February the Court directed the Bank's Committee of Treasury and the Branch Banks Committee to make arrangements for the establishment of Branches. 3  On 20 April the Branch Banks Committee were requested 'to select and report to the Court places for the establishment of Branch Banks and the most expedient mode of conducting the same'. 4

According to Sir John Clapham 'the Bank was never so inert in the hands of ministers, so much ordered about, as in 1826'. 5 The tone of the Court Book minutes, however, the choice of sites for Branch Banks before the passing of the enabling legislation of May 1826, and the speed with which the Branches were afterwards established, suggests that the directorate of the 5 The tone of the Court Book minutes, however, the choice of sites for Branch Banks before the passing of the enabling legislation of May 1826, and the speed with which the Branches were afterwards established, suggests that the directorate of the Bank had become genuinely convinced of the desirability of the new policy. The speedy establishment of the Branch Banks, of course, might be explained by the Bank's wish to obey the injunction of its Committee on 18 January to forestall the possible establishment of chartered banks by the Government, but the seemingly complete lack of delaying tactics (which, up to a point, might have been consonant with placating the Government) does not accord with the view that the Bank in 1826 was reluctant to open Branches. Such delays as occurred appear to have been due to purely administrative causes. It is noteworthy also that on 4 May 1826, three weeks before the ......................

• 1. Quoted, Acres, op. cit., p. 427 and Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 104. The fall in the Bank's income from discounts (Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 79) gave it a strong incentive for seeking business in new directions.
• 2. Acres, op. cit., p. 428 and Clapham, op. cit., vol. II, p. 105.
• 3. Acres, op. cit., p. 428.
• 4. Bank of England Court Book Xa, pp. 25, 49.
• 5. op. cit., vol. II, p. 107.

............... Country Bankers Act was passed, the Branch Banks Committee recommended the formation of a Branch at Birmingham, because of the large trade of the town 'and in order to shew the readiness of the Bank to meet the wants of a part of the country which is stated to be suffering considerable inconvenience ...' . 1

The Bank investigated carefully the merits of the places at which it was proposed to set up Branches; 2  and, as already seen, the motives for their establishment could be furtherance of the public interest and a desire to increase the Bank's profits. It has been argued that in the choice of centres the Bank was actuated primarily by its own interest and that it opened branches in towns where the banking system was sound, and where there was plenty of remunerative business;   3  but this view calls for qualification.

The Branch Banks Committee reported on 4 May 1826 'that the first attempts should be made in large Commercial and Manufacturing Towns, embracing also the Surrounding Agricultural Interests'; and they recommended that enquiries be made 'at Liverpool being the Second Commercial Town in Great Britain' and at Leeds, Birmingham and Gloucester. 4  Eleven of the 'Branch Banks' were established between July 1826 and December 1829. That at Swansea, with which this paper is especially concerned, was opened in October 1826 and was the third to be set up. It followed the Branch at Gloucester---- which had been created because of 'the peculiar state of distress existing in that neighbourhood'   5 ---and the one at Manchester; and it came before those of Birmingham, Liverpool, Bristol, Leeds, Exeter, Newcastle, Hull and Norwich.

Swansea, which was the only place in Wales to have a Branch of the Bank of England, was far from being a 'large Commercial and Manufacturing Town' of the type favoured by the Branch Banks Committee. Indeed, in 1832, John Parry Wilkins, the Brecon banker who for a time was agent of the Swansea Branch, described Swansea as 'a small place' though it was 'surrounded by a large manufacturing district'. 6 , In 1826 the population of the town was about 12,000: it was a market centre, a port, a seaside resort and in its vicinity there were metal works and collieries.

As already shown, the immediate occasion for the establishment of the Bank of England Branches was the financial crisis of 1825-26; and that was due to a number of causes. 7  The Government and the Bank of England had co-operated in reflationary measures from 1822 onwards. When over-hopeful expectations ......................

• 1. Bank of England Court Book Xa, p. 50.
• 2. ibid., passim; Westminster Bank Review, August 1953, p. 9.
• 3. Sir John Clapham: Economic History of Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1950), vol. I, p. 276; L. H. Grindon, Manchester Banks and Bankers (Manchester, 2nd ed., 1878), p. 223.
• 4. Bank of England Court Book Xa, p. 49. 
• 5. ibid., p. 64.
• 6. Committee on the Charter ... of the Bank of England (B.P.P. 1831-2, VI), Minntes of Evidence, Q1788, 1792.
• 7. These, and the course of the financial difficulties, are described fully in L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford 1956), pp. 477-497. I am grateful to Dr. Pressnell for his comments on this paper.

........................ were disappointed and credit conditions became difficult, the financial policies of the Government, the Bank of England and the country banks were so weak that they allowed the crisis to spread. The boom had caused a sharp rise in prices and, in 1824-25, the passive balance of trade resulted in a reduction in the Bank's reserve of gold. In 1825 considerable assets became tied up abroad, especially in South America; and discussions in Parliament of an issue involving the Castle in prices and, in 1824-25, the passive balance of trade resulted in a reduction in the Bank's reserve of gold. In 1825 considerable assets became tied up abroad, especially in South America; and discussions in Parliament of an issue involving the Castle Bank, Bristol, increased the nervousness among bankers by showing that they should be prepared to pay gold (and not merely Bank of England notes) on demand. From July 1825 onwards the Bank of England and other banks reduced credit, but the first serious alarm came through stoppages in the cotton trade of Liverpool in August 1825. There followed a number of country bank failures, and at the end of October the stoppage of payment by a leading house in the American trade brought nervousness to Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham. Monetary stringency increased in November and December but the panic of mid-December was probably precipitated by the contraction resulting from quarterly tax moneys having to be paid by banks to the Government in advance of its disbursements of interest on Government stock, etc., and 'by the hasty determination of the Bank of England to restrain rather than extend its discounts'. 1 When three London banks stopped payment a large number of correspondent banks (together with their banker neighbours) were seriously affected and, on December 14, the City and many towns were stricken by panic. Within a few days most areas were involved. Lewis Weston Dillwyn, F.R.S.---naturalist, head of the Cambrian Pottery at Swansea, estate owner and public-spirited citizen-stated: 'The sum abruptly locked up from our circulating medium is about £240,000 and it threatens the whole country with ruin'. He added that 'The Bank of England, surrounded with guards, was kept open to assist in relieving the panic all day' and on December 26 he mentioned that Sir Humphrey Davey, coming to stay with him near Swansea, had 'been detained two days on the road by the want of horses and the crowded state of coaches occasioned by the extraordinary panic'. 2  Bank failures continued and there were sixty of them in the harvest year (July-June) 1825-26.

The Bank of England did not institute strong remedial measures until December 1825 when its reserves were affected and when the crisis was spreading catastrophically. Then, however, it took effective steps by releasing notes, and acting clearly as a 'lender of last resort'---though only about one-eighth of the loans it allowed in the spring of 1826 had to be taken up. 3 And thereafter, with .....................

• 1. The Morning Chronicle, 19 December 1825.
• 2. N. L.W., Lewis Weston Dillwyn's 'Diary', Vol. IX. I am indebted to Mr. H. M. Stevens of Sketty, Swansea, for first drawing my attention to the entries in Dillwyn's 'Diary', for a copy of his unpublished paper on Swansea banking history, and for his generous replies to all enquiries. Mr. Stevens is a former manager of the Temple Street Branch of Lloyds Bank in Swansea, which was on the site of the old Bank of England Branch and which was destroyed by German bombs in 1941.
• 3. The Cambrian, 13 May 1826 quotes Lord Liverpool as saying that advances by the Bank of England in the previous two months totalled between £370,000 and £400,000, out of £3 millions allowed---'a proof continued his Lordship that there was more alarm than of real want of capital in the late difficulties of the commercial world'. Sir John Clapham, The Bank of England Vol. II, pp, 108-109 states that advances were 'not greatly in excess of £500,000' and that over half of those were on personal security rather than 'against goods'. Cf. E. Victor Morgan, The Theory and Practice of Central Banking (Cambridge 1943), p. 9.

................ considerable assistance from its Branches, it participated in the improvement of British banking which followed the difficulties of 1825-26.

The way in which the banking crisis spread to Swansea has been explained by Dr. Pressnell, who bases his account on the papers of a Banbury Bank. 1   It came to the town via Birmingham, which was severely affected in the late autumn of 1825 by the failure of an important firm (Samuel Williams and Co.) engaged in American trade. The direct financial link between Swansea and Birmingham at that time was the inter-locking of the banks of Gibbins, Smith and Goode of Birmingham, and Gibbins and Eaton, Swansea. A strong connection between Birmingham and Swansea had developed in the eighteenth century through the supply of copper from the am at that time was the inter-locking of the banks of Gibbins, Smith and Goode of Birmingham, and Gibbins and Eaton, Swansea. A strong connection between Birmingham and Swansea had developed in the eighteenth century through the supply of copper from the latter to the former; and in the 1790's a number of Midland users of copper came to occupy smelting works in the Swansea area. One such firm was the Rose Company which operated near Swansea from 1797 until about 1820, 2 and undoubtedly it was through his share in that enterprise that Joseph Gibbins of Birmingham became involved in banking in Swansea and Neath. 3  He had entered banking in Birmingham in 1804  4 and, just before his death in 1811, he joined Robert Eaton (the son of a former Jamaican slave-owner who had settled in Swansea and become a Quaker) 5  to set up the bank of Gibbins and Eaton---otherwise known as the 'Swansea Old Bank'. 6  One of his sons, also a Joseph Gibbins and a Quaker, took over and extended the banking interests of his father; he succeeded to the Swansea and Neath bank in 1811, to Gibbins, Smith and Goode, Birmingham in 1818 and in 1822 he was allowed 6  One of his sons, also a Joseph Gibbins and a Quaker, took over and extended the banking interests of his father; he succeeded to the Swansea and Neath bank in 1811, to Gibbins, Smith and Goode, Birmingham in 1818 and in 1822 he was allowed to join J. R. Gillett and Henry Tawney in the Banbury Bank. This has been described as 'a unique attempt to defeat the localization of banking by means of interlocking partnerships, and to short-circuit the London money market---Gibbins was now strung across the west Midlands into South Wales, and made use of Banbury funds to discount Birmingham and Swansea bills'. 7

Severe pressure was felt in November and December 1825 by Gibbins, Smith and Goode, Birmingham, who had financed merchants operating in the Latin-American trade. The first major trouble affecting the Gibbins group, however, came to the Banbury Bank, whose bills were refused discount by their London bank, Robarts, Curtis and Co.---who, like others, were much disturbed by the failure of the bank of Pole and Co., of London. In addition, failure to recover £24,000 owed it by the Birmingham bank and then to discount £40,000 of bills supplied by the latter, mounting panic and the demand for cash due to the holding of a fair in the town caused the Banbury bank to suspend payments on ................

• 1. Op. cit., pp. 492-95
• 2. Birmingham Assay Office, Letter from M. Boulton to E. Smith, 22 April 1797; The Cambrian, 3 February
• and 3 July 1823.
• 3. W. F. Crick and J. F. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint-Stock Banking (London, 1936), p. 50; Dent, Old and New Birmingham (1880), p. 338; L. S. Pressnell, op. cit. p. 27.
• 4. Pressnell, op. cit., p. 28.
• 5. Sarah J. Lury in The Friend, 7 May 1943.
• 6. Cheque of 1819 referred to by H. M. Stevens, 'The Old Bank, Temple Street, Swansea,'
• 7. L. S. Pressnell, op. cit., p. 129,

........................ December 16. 1  On December 17 the Birmingham bank 'was compelled to stop payment after a heavy run, said to have been stimulated by the failure of a customer who owed the bank £70,000'. 2  At the time of its closure Gibbins, Smith and Goode owed £32,786 10s. 6d. to Gibbins and Eaton, Swansea and Neath and this is presumed to be the result of re-discounting with the latter. 3  On 20 December the bank of Gibbins and Eaton had to close following 'a severe run which continued throughout the day'. 4  There was an immediate run on the neighbouring banks of Haynes, Day, Haynes and Lawrence (of Swansea, Llandeilo and Hay) 5 and Walters and Son (of Swansea) causing the former to close its doors. Messrs. Walters by luck or foresight managed to remain open, and, as 'Swansea's own especial bank', earned the eulogies of the local newspaper. 6  Public meetings immediately after the failure expressed confidence in the bank of Haynes and Co., and by December 24  'a few gentlemen' and 'The Trade of the Town' of Swansea gave guarantees totalling £35,000 for it---though eventually it paid only 7s. 2d. in the £ compared with the 20s. by Gibbins and Eaton . 7  Monthly and Half-Yearly Meetings of the Society of Friends in Carmarthen and Glamorgan investigated the affairs of Robert Eaton and Joseph Gibbins because, through them, 'reproach has fallen on our religious society'. They found Eaton to be of the strictest integrity but advised his withdrawal from the positions of elder and overseer. Gibbins's conduct, however, was found to be unwarrantable, but in March 1827 the Monthly Meeting pronounced that it had to act charitably towards him, and in of the strictest integrity but advised his withdrawal from the positions of elder and overseer. Gibbins's conduct, however, was found to be unwarrantable, but in March 1827 the Monthly Meeting pronounced that it had to act charitably towards him, and in August he was willing to submit his assets to an impartial committee of Quakers to effect a liquidation. 8

The failure of the two banks in Swansea 'threw the whole town and neighbourhood into a state of indescribable Consternation and distress ... and our alarm is increased by the crash of Banks both in London and throughout the country'. 9  By the middle of February 1826 L. W. Dillwyn had been called on to settle about two hundred disputes resulting from the failure of masters to pay their workmen; and such difficulties continued until April and later. 10 The copper smelting firm of Daniell, Nevill and Company of Llanelly, for example, was among the firms experiencing difficulty in making payments. 'The entire stoppage of all Circulation owing to the failure of the Banks of Swansea and this place', said ................

• 1. L. S. Pressnell, op. cit., pp. 493-95.
• 2. ibid., p. 495.
• 3. ibid., pp. 130. 495.
• 4. N.L.W., L. W. Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 20 December, 1825; The Cambrian, 24 December 1825; The Morning Chronicle, 27 December 1825.
• 5. Francis Green, 'Early Banks in West Wales', Historical Society of West Wales Transactions, Vol. VI (1916), PP. 143-4, 150.
• 6.  The Cambrian, 24 and 31 December, 1825.
• 7. N.L.W., L. W. Dillwyn's 'Diary' X, 11 July 1827; H. M. Stevens, op. cit.; The Morning Chronicle, 27 December 1825; The Cambrian, 20 January 1827.
• 8. Information kindly supplied by Mrs. M. Fay Williams, M.A.
• 9. N.L.W., L. W. Dillwyn's 'Diary', IX, 20 and 21 December 1825; cf. The Cambrian, 24 and 31 December 1825.
• 10. N.L.W., L. W. Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 16 February, 10 and 15 April 1826.

.................. R. J. Nevill on 23 January 1826, 'is the immediate cause of our difficulties and I fear they will continue for some considerable time ...' 1  The rural areas of Carmarthenshire and Pembrokeshire were badly affected, 2  and it is probable that the situation there had been aggravated by the dangerously speculative and expansive activities of dealers from the English Midlands who appeared in these counties and in Cardiganshire. 3  (They came for the numerous fairs of November 1826, calling at Brecon to exchange Midland country-bank and Bank of England notes of £20, £10 and £5 for Wilkins's notes---'chiefly small notes'. Their coming on such a large scale was a new development, due to the especially large profits then to be made in the cattle trade, for 'the drovers are generally natives of the country'. 'New people' were still appearing in the cattle trade after 1830.) 4 The Brecon Bank, whose policy in 1825 was said to have been 'very cautious' experienced a run and lost £10,000 through being forced to sell Government securities. 5  Many iron works in East Glamorganshire and in  Monmouthshire found it difficult to obtain day-to-day capital. 6

The most serious hardships in South Wales, however, were of fairly short duration; and they may have been less serious than those experienced elsewhere, for in May and June 1826 such bodies as the Swansea Commercial Society, the workers of the Neath Abbey Iron Company and the parishoners of Llandaff were contributing to reduce the distress of 'manufacturers' or workers in other places, particularly in the North of England. 7  By June 1826 the iron works of the Merthyr area were reported to be active, and in September at Liverpool, Bristol and other ports recovery was 'becoming very apparent'. 8 Nevertheless difficulties persisted, as shown by Dillwyn's entry on 21 December 1826 that he had attended a 'Meeting of the Creditors of the Neath Bank in which several of my Ynysygerwn tenants are much distressed'. 9

Following the bank failures, public meetings were held in the centres affected. At the first of such meetings held in Swansea in December 1825 'Sir John Morris, J. H. Vivian, C. Berry Davies---the Collector, H. Sockett, Dr. Grove' and L. W.............

• 1. N.L.W., Nevill MS. 5, p. 194
• 2. The Cambrian, 7 January 1826; David Williams, The Rebecca Riots (Cardiff, 1955), pp. 113-14; F. Green, art. cit., pp. 150 ff.
• 3.  Comnittee on the Charter of the Bank of England (1831-2) Q. 1642-5, 1657-9.
• 4. Committee on the Charter of the Bank of England (1831-2) Q. 1642-5, 1648-9, 1657-9, 1670-2, 1702-3; cf. P. G. Hughes, Wales and the Drovers (London, 1943), pp. 18, 23.
• 5.  Committee on the Charter of the Bank of England (1831-2) Q. 1656, 1740.
• 6. A H. John, The Industrial Development of South Wales (Cardiff 1950), p. 51
• 7. Royal Institution of South Wales, Minute Book of the Swansea Commercial Society, 4 May 1826; The Cambrian, 6 May, 2 and 10 June 1826. The crisis had severely hit 'even the North where all was thought to be secure' in December 1825 ( The Cambrian, 24 December 1825) and it recurred there in February 1826 (Pressnell, op. cit. p. 491). That 'manufacturers' in these contexts meant 'workers' is shown in the Bank of England Court Book Xa, pp. 48, 230.
• 8.  The Cambrian 2 June 1826, 23 September 1826.
• 9. N.L.W. 'Diary' IX.

................ Dillwyn 'were appointed to act as occasion might require'. 1  A deputation which was sent to London returned with a report that 'neither Government nor Bank of England can grant us the assistance we require', 2  and it was not until May 1826 that £3,000 in silver was sent 'by the Government' to the Collector of Excise in Swansea 'a supply which will happily remove the great inconvenience felt from the scarcity of that circulating medium in the town and neighbourhood'. 3

On May 26, 1826 L. W. Dillwyn, who had been fairly continuously engaged in arrangements arising out of the failure of the two Swansea banks, 'went to Grays Inn and afterwards to attend a meeting of the Bank [of England] Directors to plead for the establishment of a Branch for South Wales in Swansea', and on May 31 he was 'engaged in interviews with Mr. Manning at the Bank'. 4  He had, therefore, already been engaged in discussions at the Bank when, also on May 31, a meeting of some of the principal business men of the Swansea area 'unanimously resolved to memorialize the Bank of England to establish a Branch Bank at Swansea and appointed a deputation to wait upon the Directors'. The delegates were L. W. Dillwyn, Sir John Morris, J. H. Vivian and the Duke of Beaufort; and they were conveyed to the Bank in the latter's coach on June 5. Dillwyn added that he 'remained afterwards in private conversation with some of the Directors and have no doubt as to our success'.--- Dillwyn was engaged in further meetings at Threadneedle Street on 14 and 17 June, and the Court of Directors of the Bank resolved on July 13 to instruct the Branch Banks Committee to make enquiries for an agent, sub-agents and clerks for five towns including Swansea. 7  This information immediately reached Swansea where The Cambrian reported that the Directors of the Bank of England were 'laudably active' in seeking to assist manufacturing districts and that they had decided to establish Branches at 'Swansea, Birmingham and Manchester'. 8  It was August, however, when Dillwyn wrote that the establishment of a Branch Bank in Swansea had been decided upon; and that 'Mr. Parry Wilkins, who has received his appointment as Director, arrived to expedite the arrangements for opening the Concern'. 9  On August 19 Dillwyn met a surveyor sent by the Bank of England to consider alternative locations for the Branch. 10  Dillwyn considered one possibility, Burrows Lodge, to be 'not eligible with regard either to safety or convenience', and it was the premises of.........

• 1. N.L.W., Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 20 December 1825; The Morning Chronicle, 20 December 1825; The Cambrian, 23 December 1825.
• 2. N.L.W., Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 29 December 1825.
• 3.  The Cambrian, 6 May 1826.
• 4. N.L.W., Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 26 and 31 May 1826 et passim.
• 5.  The Cambrian, 3 June 1826.
• 6. N.L.W., Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 5 June 1826. He was 'engaged in various business all the afternoon & dined & attended the Soiree at the Athenaeum'.
• 7. Bank of England, Court Book Xa, p. 119 (13 July, 1826).
• 8. The Cambrian, 22 July 1826---a report from the Courier dated 'Swansea 14 July' which stated that the Directors 'This morning decided ....'.
• 9. N.L.W., Dillwyn's 'Diary' IX, 10 August 1826.
• 10.  ibid., 19 August 1826; Bank of England Court Book Xa, p. 141 (10 August 1826).

...................... the 'Old Bank' of Gibbins and Eaton that were chosen. 1  It is interesting that a little over a year later there was a petition to the portreeve, aldermen and burgesses of Swansea to have the proposed market built on 'Ground opposite the Branch Bank ... very eligible for the purpose ... in the most central part of the Town and nearly adjoining the Principal Streets of business and Thoroughfares'. 2  This has some significance in view of the statement that in many places 'the inconvenient situation of the premises' was a main cause of the failure of the Branch Banks to attract sufficient business. 3

The Cambrian, after mentioning on July 22 the decision to establish Bank of England Branches at Manchester, Swansea and Birmingham, referred on 5 August and 16 September to the opposition in certain quarters to the Branch Bank proposals. It was

The Cambrian, after mentioning on July 22 the decision to establish Bank of England Branches at Manchester, Swansea and Birmingham, referred on 5 August and 16 September to the opposition in certain quarters to the Branch Bank proposals. It was not until the end of September that it announced that the Old Bank premises were being repaired and would be opened as a Bank of England Branch under John Parry Wilkins of Brecon. 'We hitherto abstained', it rather incorrectly stated, 'from noticing the reports in circulation respecting the establishment of a Branch of the Bank of England at Swansea, fearful of giving publicity to statements that might not be realized'. 4  Wilkins as agent and Robert Morris as sub-agent were to receive 'wages' of £1,000 and £500 respectively per annum, 5  and they were to be assisted by two clerks and a porter. 6

The Branch Bank at Swansea was opened for business on 23 October 1826. 7  A correspondent in The Cambrian wrote: 'We have seen some of their notes, which are in every respect the same as those of the Parent Establishment, except being dated at Swansea and made payable here and in London.' 8   On 28 November L. W. Dillwyn 'drove in the afternoon in the close Carriage to Swansea and dined with a large Party with Mr. Parry Wilkins at the Bank of England'. 9

The above account shows that the establishment of a Branch Bank in Swansea, as in a number of other places, 10  followed immediately upon the petitions of influential business people in the locality. It is easy to agree with Mr. Marston Acres that 'without such petitions it is doubtful whether the Directors of the Bank would ..................

• 1. 'Diary' IX, 19 August 1826.
• 2. Royal Institution of South Wales, Minute Book of Swansea Commercial Society, 13 October 1827.
• 3.W. Marston Acres, op. cit., p. 565.
• 4.  The Cambrian, 30 September, 1826.
• 5. Bank of England Court Book Xa, p. 178 (21 September 1826).
• 6. The following instructions about the porter's livery are typical of the tight control exercised by Threadneedle Street over matters of detail at the Branches. The porter was to wear a 'Coat, Waistcoat, Breeches, Fustian Coatee and Overalls together . . . £6. 12. 6., Beaver Hat .... £0. 18. 0.'; and these 'might be procured at Swansea, provided they can be furnished in the same style and quality and for the price charged by the Tradesmen in London .... The amount may be paid from Petty Cash. Unless the whole of the above conditions can be strictly complied with the articles will be forwarded from London'. It was 'not necessary that the Porters should wear Livery after business hours'. (J. R. Elsey to J. P. Wilkins, 15 May and 2 June 1827, Bank less the whole of the above conditions can be strictly complied with the articles will be forwarded from London'. It was 'not necessary that the Porters should wear Livery after business hours'. (J. R. Elsey to J. P. Wilkins, 15 May and 2 June 1827, Bank of England London---Swansea Letter Book I).
• 7. W. M. Acres, 'Closed Branches of the Bank: Swansea', The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street, VII, 43 (September 1931), p. 169; The Cambrian, 28 October 1826.
• 8. 28 October 1826.
• 9. N.L.W. 'Diary' IX.
• 10. W. M. Acres, The Bank of England from Within, Vol. II, Chapter 50.

............... ever have considered establishing a Branch in Wales'. 1  And it is interesting to find a suggestion that officials of the Bank later attached some importance to having a Welsh Branch, for, when the removal of the Branch from Swansea was contemplated in 1842, the agent there wrote of the city which is now the capital of the Principality that 'it is in Wales' . 2

In the original deliberations about the proper place for a Branch in South Wales, Swansea did not gain undisputed approval. Indeed, the Branch Banks Committee of the Bank also considered Cardiff, Newport and Merthyr, and 'after conference with Thompson & Foreman and Wm. Routh (Crawshay & Co.) fixed on Swansea' . 3   Of the three towns competing against it Merthyr alone had a larger population than Swansea. And it is noteworthy that, comparing 1826 with 1825, merchants dealing in products such as those made in the Swansea area---'copper merchants', 'coal factors, merchants and shipowners' and 'iron merchants and ironmongers'---increased their demands for discounts from the Bank of England; whereas others, notably bankers, overseas traders, textile merchants and 'tea dealers, grocers and sugar refiners' reduced considerably their demand for such discounts. 4  It may well be also that, following the loss of its monoply of joint-stock banking outside London, the Bank regarded Swansea as a good place in which to forestall any joint-stock banks that might appear in South Wales. As might be expected, the Branch Banks Committee turned down a proposal made by 'Deputation and letter' that a Branch be established in Haverfordwest, because 'the commerce of the place is far too limited'. 5  The Committee and the Court of Directors of the Bank, representing as they were a private banking corporation, seem quite naturally to have decided that public service could best be rendered in the places where the opportunities of reward were greatest.

R. O. ROBERTS.

University College of Swansea.

• 1. 'Closed Branches', p. 168.
• 2. Bank of England, Swansea to London Letter Book 2, T. L. Whitehouse to T. C. Turner, 3 November 1842.
• 3. Ibidem (marginal note).
• 4. Bank of England, Court Book Xa, pp. 279-81.
• 5. Bank of England, Swansea to London Letter Book 2, 3 November 1842.

Kenneth O Morgan, National Library of Wales journal. 1972, Winter Volume XVII/4

Extracted onto the pages of GENUKI with the kind permission of the National Library of Wales

This is a complete extract of this article (Gareth Hicks April 2003)

THE triumph of the Labour Party in south Wales, and its supplanting of the Liberals in the industrial valleys, has too often been regarded as an inevitable process. In reality, the advance of Labour in the early years of the twentieth century was a chequered and erratic affair, with many setbacks. The kind of difficulties which Labour faced, and the manner in which they were partly overcome, are graphically illustrated in the letter-files of the first secretary of the Labour Representation Committee (re-christened the Labour Party in February 1906). 1  The secretary of the LRC at this period was J. Ramsay MacDonald, years later (in 1924) to become Labour's first prime minister.

The letters printed below illuminate aspects of the growth of the political Labour movement in a variety of constituencies in the years after the formation of the LRC in February 1900. 2  Letters 1 and 2 deal with the remarkable contest in Gower in the 'khaki election' of October 1900. 3  Here, John Hodge, an Englishman and secretary of the Steel Smelters' union, stood for Labour against a local Liberal employer, J. Aeron Thomas. To the general astonishment, Hodge was only very narrowly defeated in this most Welsh of constituencies by the margin of 426 votes. As Hodge tells MacDonald, he was handicapped in Gower by the opposition of prominent local miners' leaders, notably John Williams, the miners' agent for the Western district of the coalfield (and later to become first 'Lib-Lab.' and then Labour M.P. for the Gower, 1906-22). In addition, there was strong pressure in the constituency for Labour to run a Welsh candidate there next time. Even so, as Hodge points out, the strikingly high Labour poll set off something of a chain reaction throughout the Swansea valley, and in the town of Swansea itself. The journal, Llais Llafur, edited by D. J. Rees at Ystalyfera, carried the message of the ILP throughout the valley community. One consequence, as Matt Giles (secretary of the Swansea Socialist Society) tells MacDonald in letter 3, was that the Swansea Trades' Council decided to affiliate to the LRC in November 1901. 4  Giles, who had come to Swansea in 1899 as an advertising agent for Fry's Cocoa and was later to become the full-time organiser for the Workers' Union in south Wales, was himself a major propagandist for the socialist Cause over forty years. By 1908 he had made the Swansea branch of the Workers' Union, with 500 members, the largest in the British Isles.

The only seat with a Labour member of parliament at this time, however, was Merthyr Tydfil. Here, in a famous contest, Keir Hardie had ousted the Liberal, Pritchard Morgan, as the junior member in the 'khaki election' of 1900, despite the imperialist passions aroused by the Boer War. 5  But, as letter 4 below indicates, Hardie's position in Merthyr was still far from secure: H. T. Hanson, the writer, was a sub-editor on the local Liberal newspaper, the Merthyr Express, as well as an active member of the ILP. As Hanson points out, there was the prospect of a severe Liberal challenge in Merthyr at the next election, while the miners were still to affiliate to the LRC. Hardie's rather chaotic methods of organisation provided another problem for his local constituency workers. Even so, Labour's cause made steady progress in the Merthyr Boroughs thereafter, especially in local government. Letter 5 below, written by Dai Davies, Pant (the secretary of the Merthyr Trades Council) illustrates the challenge that Labour was putting up in the borough elections in the autumn of 1905. In the event, Labour candidates were remarkably successful, all twelve being elected and Enoch Morrell becoming the first Labour mayor of Merthyr. 6  In the general election that followed in January 1906, Hardie comfortably beat off a last-minute challenge by an unofficial Liberal candidate, the shipowner, Henry Radcliffe.

In these circumstances, letter 6 below, by Richard Davies, a Welshman who was secretary of the Municipal Employees' Association, is interesting because it is so wrong-headed. Even to an intelligent observer like Davies, the omens could be totally misleading. In fact, his premonitions of sweeping Tory gains in south Wales were based wholly on his estimate of the situation in Cardiff. Here, the Conservatives captured control of the council in 1904, while Labour councillors such as W. S. Crossman, John Chappell and John Jenkins 7 (all of them firm 'Lib-Labs.') stood out by their rarity. In a large, heterogenous constituency like Cardiff, with its diversity of trades, Labour was notoriously hard to organise. Letter 7, from John Watt (secretary of the Cardiff ILP and later to become a member of the ILP's National Administrative Council) illustrates some of the difficulties with Lib.-Lab. councillors dominating the local LRC. On the other hand, Richard Davies's assumption that Lloyd George's 'revolt' against the 1902 Balfour Education Act was driving shoals of Welshmen into the arms of the Conservatives was proved to be absurd. In the general election of January 1906, Tory candidates were defeated in every seat in Wales, most of them by immense margins. 8  Apart from Keir Hardie in Merthyr, every Welsh constituency returned a Liberal: Ivor Guest even captured Cardiff for the Liberals with a majority of over 3,000 votes. On the other hand, Richard Davies's comment that 'religion and education are the two.......................

...................... main ideas in the Welsh mind' was not without foundation as a description of Edwardian Wales. Certainly, Wales was still far from being a stronghold of socialism. Bodies like the ILP or the Marxist Social Democratic Federation were small and struggling organisations in the Welsh valleys. In Cardiff, they were weaker still: not until 1918 did Labour even put up a parliamentary candidate there.

After the general election of 1906, there was a temporary mood of elation amongst Labour Party workers in south Wales, newly inspired by the return of twenty-nine independent Labour members to the House. Matt Giles, in letter 8 below, sees a prospect of another Labour candidature, this time in Swansea Town, after the calamitous withdrawal of J. Littlejohns, the official candidate, prior to the election. But MacDonald was brusque and unenthusiastic; in any case, no by-election took place in Swansea. Despite the success of several Labour candidates in Swansea borough elections after 1906, the Labour Party was still unable to mount an effective challenge to the Liberals in parliamentary contests. Ben Tillett's unofficial candidature in Swansea Town in January 1910 when he finished well down at the bottom of the poll even in this constituency where dockers were numerous, was a disaster. Elsewhere, too, some of the earlier optimism had evaporated. In letter 9 below, a schoolmaster who served as secretary of the Aberdare ILP over a long period explains to MacDonald that vigorous propaganda was still required in Merthyr to sustain Keir Hardie's position as member. Hardie himself was prostrated by illness at this time, much of his private business being conducted by his close colleague, the eccentric Salvationist, Frank Smith. Hardie was shortly to set off on a spectacular tour around the world to regain his strength. This removed him from his Merthyr constituents for almost a year in 1907-8, and much depended on local Labour stalwarts like Price, John Prowle and Edmund Stonelake. Meanwhile, in north Wales, as shown in letter 10 from Edward Francis, the secretary of the ILP branch in Wrexham, efforts were being made to form an organised Labour Party there. But in the north, apart from a few pockets of strength in the Caernarvonshire quarrying areas 9  and parts of the east Denbighshire coalfield, Labour was still in a feeble condition, and the Liberal ascendancy overwhelming. At the end of 1908, therefore, on the eve of the eruption of violent industrial unrest in the mining valleys, the progress that Labour had achieved since the 1900 election was still very hard to assess.

Ultimately, it was industrial protest which provided the key to the triumph of the Labour Party in south Wales, the fierce class conflict unleashed in the Tonypandy disturbances and the Cambrian strike in 1910-11, the solidarity of trades unionism during the war, the new militancy and power of the Welsh working class during the economic ................

........................ dislocation of the immediate post-war period. By 1922, Labour had effectively displaced the Liberal ascendancy throughout the great majority of constituencies in south Wales, and was making some inroads in Gwynedd also. 10  Until the eve of the first world war, however, the political arm of the Labour movement remained comparatively weak, despite the charismatic presence of a leader like Hardie, despite even such encouragements as the miners' vote for affiliation to the Labour Party at the end of 1908. The letters appended here illustrate some of the struggles that Labour's early pioneers had to endure. They also, perhaps, indicate some of the perils of assuming an inevitability in the interpretation of our recent political past.

KENNETH 0. MORGAN

The Queen's College, Oxford

The Letters;

1. John Hodge to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 17 October 1900.   11

If we had had three more days we would have won, had it not been for several trade union political blacklegs who opposed me, the more prominent being John Williams, Miners Agent, in addition to which Mabon sent my opponent a telegram wishing him success; it is rumoured that my opponent promised £50 towards his election expenses. Presume its cause and effect.

2. John Hodge to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 29 March 1901.    12

In reply to your favour of the 17th since the general election I have addressed several meetings in the Gower constituency. I am afraid, however, that the Welshmen are so provincial in their characteristics that if it was possible to select a Welshman in the labour interest for that constituency there would be more heart and go put into the fight than by either a Scotchman or an Englishman standing. The effects of my fight in Gower has [ sic] been far reaching. For instance in Swansea the Trades Council ran three candidates for three different Wards, and succeeded in returning the three; on the request of that Council I made a special journey to Swansea, and in conjunction with Tillet [ sic] did all we could to assist the candidates so promoted; then at the School Board election where they had one man they ran two, and returned both, again Tillet [ sic] and myself assisted. In Pontardulais and Gorseinon men were nominated out of the ranks of Labour as candidates for the Urban Council, the result I do not yet know. Ystalyfera did likewise, and in Llanelly they ran labour candidates for both the Guardians and the County Council, the whole of that district is therefore ripe; probably the wisest course to adopt with respect to this constituency would be --- if your Executive would call a conference of trade unionists, Friendly Society representatives, and all other progressive bodies, with a view of selecting a candidate for the next general election; if selected by such a conference I would be perfectly willing to again contest the seat, or if they selected someone else I should he quite willing to fall in and do anything that I could amongst our members in that Division to assist the candidature of the nominee of such a meeting: at any rate irrespective of Gower I would be prepared to consider the invitation from a Borough constituency in preference to a County constituency on the score of expense.

3. Matt Giles to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 28 November 1901.    13

I am pleased to inform you that last night the Swansea Trades & Labour Council decided to affiliate to the Labour Rep. Com ... There are a few strong men on the Council who are rather inclined to a Liberal-Labour representative & who view with suspicion anything done by we Socialists, it will require a large amount of tact to clear the shoals ahead. We have had an open opposition so far, only just quibbling, so it's as well that we should be armed with all facts. A committee was appointed to organize this public meeting & conference, which is composed of a majority of Socialists. So you may be assured that your wishes will be carried out to the letter.

4. H. T. Hanson to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 10 June 1903.   14

Our local secretary (Dai Davies) and myself have been conferring over your letter of the 6th, and are sadly disappointed that Hardie has led us astray. It is marvellous that a man so straight and never-failing in public life should be so haphazard in private. Now, we behind the scenes here realise that a great deal depends on the success of this Labour Conference. The occasion is critical for it comes at the very psychological moment when the Whig Liberals are intriguing to oust Hardie. They are actually negotiating with a rich colliery owner (& a Welshman to boot) to be their candidate. Our policy is a double one, therefore, in getting this conference --- not only to make our organization secure, but so to far compromise the chief labour leaders of the district before they are got at by this new move of the Liberals. Once get them to declare for us, & they will not turn back. The moment is critical --- and it is not only important for the Merthyr seat, but for Wales, for if we lead & hold firm, other seats in Wales will follow. Try, therefore, between you & Hardie to make our Conference an assured success.

5. Dai Davies to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 22 September 1905.     15

We are in the thick of battle here: fighting for Labour to have the moulding of our new Borough Council. We have candidates in the 8 wards for the round, in some 2 & others one candidate; & I hope on Nov. 9th that Labour will be in a position to say who the first Mayor is to be.

6. Richard Davies to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 30 October 1905.  16

It has always been a marvel to me why the Party has not gone in for active and continuous propaganda work in South Wales, all the elements and conditions exist there for the building up of a fine staunch Labour Party and owing to the neglect of the I.L.P. the workers are slowly drifting into Toryism. Cardiff itself affords a striking illustration of what I mean. Fourteen years ago when I lived in Cardiff 7  Labour Candidates were run for the Town Council, one of these (Councillor Crossman) was successful and the others polled a very respectable number of votes. I myself, as one of the Cadidates, put in the field one week before the Election day, came within 74 votes of one of the strongest Liberal candidates. There was then a good Liberal majority on the Council and the sentiment in favour of Labour Representation was strong & growing stronger. What are the facts today? There is a Tory majority on the Council, Crossman who was selected as a Labour man is either President or Vice President of the Liberal Party while Chappel [ sic] the only other Labour man openly supports the candidates of the Liberal Party. (I don't count Jenkins who has always run under the auspices of the Liberal or Radical Party).
As things stand now the Lloyd George policy of starving the schools is driving men away from the Liberal Party in shoals and having nowhere else to go they are joining the Tories. The Welsh educational policy may be a fine object lesson for England but it's a very bad policy for Wales where the zeal for education occupies the same position as it did in Scotland twenty-five or thirty years ago. I know Welsh parents today who are going short of the necessaries of life to give their children a good education. Religion and education are the two main ideas in the Welsh mind at the present time.
There I did not mean to write all this but only to urge you to help the Welsh Labour men if you can.

7. J  Watt to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 13 November 1905.   17

The local L.R.C. is in a thoroughly unsatisfactory state. The T.C. nominees are more distinctly Liberal than ever. (All three, Crossman, Chappell & Jenkins engaged in supporting Lib. municipal candidates.) The L.R.C. is in hands of Lib.-Lab. sec. & we have failed to get L.R.C. to pull up the Lib.Lab. Councillors. A considerable amount of wages is owing Chappell & Crossman who get when fully paid £2/10/0 a week. Several Unions in consequence of the Independent position not being taken up are withdrawing & Labour Representation is suffering. All our chaps are lying low. If they work for L.R.C. they simply strengthen the Lib. Lab. tactics and as they are doing nothing it is crumbling away --- not the tactics but the L.R.C. itself. The Parliamentary Com(mittee) is quite independent which is awaiting replies from Dew & Raynor as to whether they would stand provided they were adopted.

8. Matt Giles to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 12 February 1906.   18

[There is a probable vacancy in Swansea Town as Sir George Newnes is likely to be made a peer. John Littlejohns' candidature on behalf of Labour had collapsed].
They admired his ability, but, as Littlejohns always had a rather cynical contempt for the people instead of a little human feeling & sympathy he never got near enough to them, there was also a strain & a coldness when in close contact with the mass, which was deadly, especially in Wales.

9. W. W. Price to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 28 April 1907.    19

Great Demonstration: Aberdare. Some time ago Mr. Keir Hardie asked me to consult Stanton (Miners' Agent) & Stonelake (Sec. of Trades Council) re the intended big demonstration in Aberdare on July 22nd. The elections for Dist. Council & Guardians intervened & we failed to meet.
However we talked the matter over this morning and considered the pros & cons of whether to have purely I.L.P. demonstration, a L.R.C. or a Miners' demonstration. Ultimately we thought it well to have a joint meeting --- I.L.P., Trades Council & Miners' etc. and the expenses to be shared by all the bodies ...
The L.R.C. is really dead here. The question of putting new life into it has caused a great deal of anxiety to our comrade Hardie ... I am sorry I cannot very well trouble Hardie with the details now as he is too weak. I have written to F. Smith to consult him when he considers Hardie well enough. Therefore I should like to know if the draft I have made out of the intended Demonstration meets with your approval.
The speakers are yourself, Hardie & Barnes.

10. Edward Francis to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 21 July 1907.    20

I have to bring to your notice the effort we are to make to form a local Labour Party [in Wrexham] and enclose a copy of the circular letter we have forwarded to the various Trades Unions. The existing Trades Council is almost lifeless and the I.L.P. though vigorous is wanting in numbers.
[Letter from the secretaries of the Wrexham Trades and Labour Council and the secretary of the Wrexham ILP enclosed.]

Notes;

1 I am much indebted to the Labour Party librarian, Mrs. Irene Wagner, for access to these files. At the time of writing, only the files up to the end of 1908 are available.

2 The most comprehensive account of the rise of Labour in these years is Frank Bealey and Henry Pelling, Labour and Politics, 1900-1906 (London, 1958). There is also some material in chapters V and VI in Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922 (Cardiff, second edition, 1970).

3 I have covered this contest in 'The Khaki Election in Gower' Gower XIII (1960). The local press is the indispensable source here: see, particularly, Henry Davies on 'Labour's Defeat at Gower', Llais Llafur, 20 October 1900. Davies was an official of the Tin and Sheet Millmen. John Williams replied in Llais Llafur, 3 November 1900: he attacked Hodge for, among other things, going against the decision of the local Liberal and Labour Association.

4 An invaluable source here is Stan Awbery, Labour's Early Struggles in Swansea (Swansea, 1949). Also Richard Hyman, The Workers' Union (Oxford, 1971), pp. 26-7.

5 See Kenneth O. Morgan, 'The Merthyr of Keir Hardie', in Glanmor Williams (ed.), Merthyr Politics: the making of a Working-Class Tradition (Cardiff, 1966), pp. 67ff.; Kenneth O. Fox, 'Labour and Merthyr's Khaki Election', Welsh History Review, Vol. II, No. 4 (1965).

6 Glamorgan Free Press, 11 November 1905. Morrell, a Welsh-speaking Welshman, was originally a colliery boy and checkweighman. He was later to serve as president of the South Wales Miners' Federation at the time of the general strike of 1926.

7 Jenkins sat as 'Lib.-Lab.' M.P. for Chatham, 1906-10.

8 See Kenneth O. Morgan, Wales in British Politics, pp. 219-21.

9 See Cyril Parry, The Radical Tradition in Welsh Politics (Hull, 1970), chapter III.

10 ibid., pp. 69-70. Labour also held Wrexham, 1922-4 and 1929-31.

11 Labour Representation Committee letter-files (Transport House), 1/181.

12  ibid., 2/138.

13 ibid., 3/362.

14 ibid., 9/172.

15 ibid., 25/91.

16 ibid., 27/195.

17 ibid., 27/344.

18 ibid., 31/360.

19 Labour Party General Correspondence, 14/1.

20 ibid., 17/405/1.